

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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P R 031915Z JUL 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2616

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT GENEVA 0214

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JULY 3, 1975  
(SALT TWO-659)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER  
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 3, 1975.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JULY 3, 1975

TO BEGIN WITH, I WOULD LIKE TO GREET YOU PERSONALLY,  
MR. AMBASSADOR, THE U.S. DELEGATION AND ITS STAFF, UPON  
RESUMPTION IN GENEVA OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR  
AND U.S. DELEGATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE  
ARMS.

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WE BEGIN WORK TODAY AFTER A RECESS SINCE MAY 8, 1975.

IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THE WORKING RECESS, THE DELEGATIONS ENGAGED IN WORKING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET-U.S. SUMMIT MEETING IN VLADIVOSTOK IN NOVEMBER 1974. THE RESULTS OF THIS WORK ARE REFLECTED IN THE MAY 7 WORKING DOCUMENT-- THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT PREPARED AD REFERENDUM TO HEADS OF DELEGATION. THIS FACT IS A POSITIVE POINT OF DEPARTURE.

DURING ITS STAY IN MOSCOW, THE USSR DELEGATION HELD APPROPRIATE EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS ON QUESTIONS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE HIGHEST AUTHORITIES OF THE COUNTRY. THE RELEVANT ISSUES INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT A JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WERE ANALYZED.

THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE QUESTION OF PREPARING THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

AS YOU KNOW, BASED ON THE PROGRAM OF PEACE ADOPTED BY THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU, THE SOVIET UNION CONSISTENTLY STRIVES FOR REAL STEPS TO CONTAIN AND ULTIMATELY CURB THE ARMS RACE, TO COMPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE BY DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT ACHIEVING AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE CONCLUSION OF A NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE FOR REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE IN THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF OUR TWO STATES, AND WOULD SERVE THE CAUSE OF STRENGTHENING WORLD PEACE.

MEASURES TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF WAR AND HALT THE ARMS RACE ARE CENTRAL TO SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THIS IS WHY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. ATTACH SUCH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, BOTH SIDES INTEND TO COMPLETE WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT

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IN 1975, SO THAT IT COULD BE SIGNED DURING L. I. BREZHNEV'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

IN A SPEECH AT A MEETING WITH VOTERS ON JUNE 13, 1975, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU L. I. BREZHNEV EXPRESSED HIS CONFIDENCE THAT NEW MAJOR AND GENUINE STEPS TOWARD A MORE STABLE AND VIABLE PEACE ON OUR ENTIRE PLANET COULD WELL BE TAKEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THIS,

HE SAID, ALSO APPLIES TO RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. L. I. BREZHNEV EMPHASIZED THAT STEPS TOWARD FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS WHICH "ARE AT PRESENT BEING PLANNED IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORTHCOMING NEW SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING THIS YEAR, INCLUDING THE SIGNING OF A NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS BASED ON THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, ARE VERY NECESSARY AND IMPORTANT STEPS."

THE DELEGATIONS HAVE THE TASK OF WORKING SERIOUSLY, IN AN ORGANIZED MANNER AND AT AN ADEQUATE PACE, SO AS TO STAY WITHIN THE ALLOTTED TIME. THIS REQUIRES OF BOTH SIDES A BUSINESS-LIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO CARRYING OUT THEIR MISSION, FOR ONLY BY JOINT EFFORTS WILL WE BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF OUR WORK.

## II

AS EMPHASIZED BY M.A. SUSLOV, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, IN HIS ADDRESS AT A MEETING WITH A DELEGATION OF U.S. SENATORS IN MOSCOW ON JUNE 30, 1975, THE UNDERSTANDING ON THE ISSUES OF LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, REACHED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VLADIVOSTOK, IS HIGHLY REGARDED IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE PROVISIONS OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE NEW LONG-TERM AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ALONG WITH THE LIMITATION OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS, WHICH WERE AGREED UPON AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, ARE ALSO NOTEWORTHY IN THAT THEY CONTAIN SUCH A NEW ELEMENT AS THE FIRST MEASURES ON QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, AS WELL AS--AND THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT--IN THAT THEY ARE AIMED AT UNCEASING AND, WHAT IS MORE, GROWING JOINT EFFORTS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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M.A. SUSLOV TOOK SPECIAL NOTE OF THE UNDERSTANDING TO THE EFFECT THAT NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS WILL BEGIN LONG BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE TERM OF THE AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED, WHICH COVERS THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985.

## III

THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING PROVIDES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES. THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, WHICH IS TO GUIDE THE DELEGATIONS IN THEIR WORK ON THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, CONTAINS RELEVANT INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS SCORE. THE JOINT TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT CONTAINS AGREED LANGUAGE REFLECTING THIS UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN THE SIDES.

IN WORKING OUT THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT AGREE-  
MENT, THE OBJECT IS NOT TO PERMIT DEVIATIONS FROM THIS  
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE, SO THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE  
BE AN EMBODIMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL  
SECURITY, IN FACT, RATHER THAN IN WORDS.

IV

IN TERMS OF ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK ASSIGNED TO US, IT  
IS IMPORTANT THAT, BASED ON THE EXISTING ACCORD, A MUTUAL  
UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN SET DOWN CONCERNING RECORDING IN THE  
JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THE MAXIMUM LEVELS OF  
STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES SPECIFIED IN THE AIDE-  
MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, LIMITED BY AN AGGREGATE NUMBER  
NOT TO EXCEED 2,400 UNITS. THERE IS COMMON UNDERSTANDING  
REGARDING INCLUSION, IN PARTICULAR, OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS  
AND SLBM LAUNCHERS IN THIS AGGREGATE NUMBER.

HEAVY BOMBERS ARE ALSO COUNTED IN THIS AGGREGATE NUMBER.  
THIS IMPORTANT PROVISION OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10,  
1974 IS INCLUDED IN THE JOINT TEXT OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW

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AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, OF COURSE, THERE MUST BE NO DEVIATION FROM WHAT HAS BEEN AGREED UPON IN VLADIVOSTOK; ATTEMPTS TO GIVE AN EXPANDED INTERPRETATION TO THE TERM "HEAVY BOMBERS" BY INCLUDING IN IT, AND CONSEQUENTLY ALSO IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF 2,400, AIRCRAFT WHICH CLEARLY ARE NOT HEAVY BOMBERS, ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE TASK OF WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DRAFT AGREEMENT. SUCH ATTEMPTS CAN ONLY LEAD THE DISCUSSION OFF ON A TANGENT AND SLOW DOWN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TASK PUT BEFORE THE DELEGATIONS. HEAVY BOMBERS, NATURALLY, INCLUDE ONLY THOSE AIRCRAFT WHICH REALLY ARE HEAVY BOMBERS, AND ARE A SUBJECT FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS THE FIRM POSITION OF THE SOVIET SIDE.

THE QUESTION OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KM WAS CONSIDERED IN DETAIL IN THE COURSE OF PAST DISCUSSIONS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE AGREEMENT MUST ACCURATELY REFLECT THE PROVISION OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, WHICH SPECIFIES THAT AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KM WILL BE COUNTED IN THE SECRET

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AGGREGATE NUMBER OF 2,400 WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM. THIS LIMITATION APPLIES EQUALLY TO ALL AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES--WHETHER BALLISTIC, CRUISE OR OF ANY OTHER TYPE. THIS IS CLEAR FROM THE TEXT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, AND THIS ENSUES FROM THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS IN THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, WHICH SETS A QUANTITATIVE LIMIT ON THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE SIDES, WAS A MAJOR STEP TOWARD SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING THEM. IT IS IMPORTANT TO PREVENT LEAVING OPEN WAYS OF CIRCUMVENTING THE UNDERSTANDING ON THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THROUGH DEPLOYMENT OF ANY TYPE OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KM. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR USING A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO AIR-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES, FOR EXAMPLE. LEAVING SUCH MISSILES OUTSIDE OF AGREED LIMITATIONS WOULD ENTAIL THE POTENTIAL DANGER OF A STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, ALBEIT IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT DIRECTION. AFTER ALL, IF ONE OF THE SIDES WERE TO ADOPT SUCH A COURSE, THE OTHER WOULD BE FORCED TO RESPOND BY TAKING SIMILAR ADEQUATE MEASURES, I.E., THE ACTION-REACTION CYCLE WOULD RESUME.

THE SOVIET SIDE IS CONVINCED THAT LEAVING ANY TYPE OF

AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS OUTSIDE THE LIMITATIONS OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF 2,400 WOULD NOT ONLY BE CONTRARY TO THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SCORE, BUT ALSO TO THE TASK WHICH THE SIDES SET THEMSELVES IN ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING SPECIFIES PRECISELY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY THE ARMS TO BE LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. ARBITRARILY TO EXPAND OR, CONVERSELY, TO NARROW THE ASSORTMENT OF SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED WOULD IN PRACTICE MEAN TO DEPART FROM AGREED DECISIONS AND WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO EMBODYING IN THE AGREEMENT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, UNDER  
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THE TERMS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THE SIDES WILL HAVE THE RIGHT AT THEIR OWN DISCRETION TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF THEIR SYSTEMS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE AGREED AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. A CORRESPONDING FORMULATION, IN PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS FORM, IS CONTAINED IN THE MAY 7, 1975 JOINT TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS PRINCIPLE NOT ONLY BE PROCLAIMED, BUT ALSO IMPLEMENTED. ACCORDINGLY, THE AGREEMENT MUST NOT CONTAIN ANY PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRADICT THIS PRINCIPLE, ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE SIDES.

V

THE USSR DELEGATION IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO WORK ON PREPARATION OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT CONSTRUCTIVELY, ON THE BASIS OF, AND IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974. ONLY BY BEING CONSISTENTLY GUIDED BY THE CONTENT AND SPIRIT OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN WE ENSURE THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY IS EMBODIED IN THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

WE HOPE THAT THE U.S. SIDE, TOO, WILL ADHERE TO THE SAME APPROACH AT THE NEGOTIATIONS BEING RESUMED.

UNQUOTEJOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SALT (ARMS CONTROL), MEETING DELEGATIONS, SPEECHES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 03 JUL 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
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**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 24 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <24 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <14 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JULY 3, 1975 (SALT TWO-659)  
**TAGS:** PARM, UR, US  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006